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Abstract
This paper is based on the premise that an overreliance on law in transitional justice fails to suffi-
ciently address the long-term aims of healing and reconciliation, particularly in post-conflict societies. 
As a result of transitional justice’s political, international and institutional character in the form of 
legalism, other viable mechanisms are restricted. The key issue revolves around the ownership of any 
process and the failure of transitional justice to sufficiently consider aims outside retributive justice 
and the legitimacy of the state post-conflict. Focusing on legalism’s above characteristics, this paper 
considers the practical problems that legal dominance creates and discusses the quasi-judicial alter-
natives of gacaca and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, before taking into account the practices 
in post-Communist Eastern Europe.
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2مقالة بحثية
هل التطبيق الصارم للقانون هو السبيل الأمثل دوماً؟ بين المقاربة 
الجزئية والمنهج الشمولي في فهم مجتمعات ما بعد الصراع
جا�سمين �أديموفيت�ش 
 بكالوريو�س في الحقوق مع مرتبة ال�شرف
ماج�شتير في القانون الجنائي الدولي
مدير ال�شوؤون القانونية والعقود، �شركة تيلز، م�شروع مترو الدوحة
moc.ebolg-mcs@saj
ملخص 
ي�شتند هذا البحث على فر�شية مفادها اأن الاعتماد المبالغ فيه على قوة و�شيادة القانون في العدالة الانتقالية يف�شل 
في تحقيق الاأهداف البعيدة المدى المتمثلة في التئام المجتمع والو�شول اإلى الم�شالحة، خ�شو�شً ا في مجتمعات ما بعد 
ال�شراع. وب�شبب الطبيعة ال�شيا�شية والدولية والموؤ�ش�شية التي ت�شاحب العدالة الانتقالية، والتي تتمثل في التطبيق الحرفي 
للقانون، ُتفر�س القيود على ا�شتخدام اآليات اأخرى رغم قابليتها و�شلاحيتها للتطبيق. وتكمن الم�شكلة الاأ�شا�شية فيمن 
يملك اتخاذ القرار في تطبيق اأية معالجة، وف�شل العدالة الانتقالية في اإدراك اأهداف اأخرى خارج اإطار العدالة الانتقامية 
وفر�س �شرعية الدولة في مرحلة ما بعد النزاع. ومن خلال التركيز على ال�شمات والخ�شائ�س المذكورة اأعلاه والتي 
ت�شاحب التطبيق ال�شارم لن�س القانون، يلقي البحث نظرة على الم�شاكل الم�شاحبة لهذا التطبيق، ثم يناق�س البدائل 
�شبه الق�شائية مثل نظام الجاكاكا (acacaG) ولجان تق�شي الحقائق والم�شالحة، وبعدها يلقي نظرة على الممار�شات 
التي ُطبقت في مجتمعات اأوروبا ال�شرقية عقب انتهاء حقبة ال�شيوعية.
الكلمات المفتاحية: القانون الجنائي الدولي، العدالة الانتقالية، البو�شنة، نظام الجاكاكا، �شيادة القانون
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3Introduction
Transitional justice encompasses a variety of processes and methods, carried out with the purpose of 
ensuring a society is able to come to terms with and transition from a history of large-scale abuse and/
or conflict, by way of ensuring accountability, serving traditional notions of justice and enhancing the 
prospect of reconciliation.1 One of the tools utilized is “legalism”—the legal prosecution of perpetrators 
via judicial mechanisms. In contrast, non-judicial mechanisms include lustration, truth, and reconciliation 
commissions (TRCs) and other quasi-judicial processes, such as Rwanda’s Gacaca, not to mention various 
politically and economically focused reforms.
While the past twenty-four years have seen an expansion in the scope of mechanisms utilized and 
effectiveness of transitional justice both as a field of study and in its practical implementation, the primary 
focus at the international level has been legalism. The most significant examples are the formation of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), along with various domestic prosecutions and 
ad hoc hybrid tribunals in Cambodia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, and Kosovo.
The dominance of legalism, which is typically administered via a top-down, centralized and internationalized 
format, using the Yugoslav blueprint, has left behind a considerable deficit that in the long run, both for 
the effectiveness of legal objectives and the success and viability of transitioning states, is likely to prove 
counterproductive.
This atomistic focus on prosecutions, primarily targeting a small number of individuals either under direct 
command or responsibility, highlights the lack of a truly holistic approach to transitional justice. The net 
effect is an overreliance on criminal justice mechanisms, signifying not only that transitional justice has 
become self-serving, largely of, by, and for international criminal law practitioners, but that it has been set 
up for failure. The consequences of such failures are potentially catastrophic. At present, there appears to 
be relatively little danger in Rwanda and Cambodia. In contrast, Bosnia and the western Balkans continue 
to present a significant risk of relapse. Plagued by continued racial division, endemic corruption, economic 
failure, nationalist or ethnic-based political discourse and a quietly simmering tension, Bosnia is seen by 
many commentators and observers as possessing the ingredients for another armed conflict.2
Of course, transitional justice mechanisms cannot carry the whole weight of expectations for transitioning 
post-conflict states; the role of international diplomacy and the post-conflict political order, including 
internationally imposed economic and political reforms, prove to be of fundamental importance. In Bosnia’s 
context, the failures of the Dayton Agreement beyond the initial short-term goals of ending the war and 
providing a degree of stability for the transition are clear to see. While it is difficult to sever liability for 
the nation’s failures, a key concern has always been the political foundation laid by Dayton. 
At the same time, once Bosnia’s legally focused transition is compared to, for example, Rwanda, the 
lack of sufficiently wide-ranging non-legalist methods is noticeable. It is this exclusivity that has played 
a crucial role in fostering a level of stasis and never-ending tension. However, even the internationalized 
focus of legalism has failed within the parameters of delivering justice and accountability on account 
of prosecutions largely targeting leading national and regional figures within the conflict. In contrast to 
Rwanda, an overwhelming number of the perpetrators continue to live freely without the prospect of any 
retributive justice. Beyond this is the failure to expand the scope of the transition to include, for example, 
TRCs as a way for perpetrators to admit their guilt and to reveal how individuals were killed or where the 
last remaining bodies and mass graves are located.
1- U.N.S.C., Secretary general report on rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and postconflict societies, 4, U.N. Doc. 
S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2004/616.
2- See Timothy Less, The next Balkan wars, New Statesman (June 6, 2016), https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2016/06/
next-balkan-wars (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
4Importance of Law
Theoretically, law can deliver justice and provide accountability for violations of human rights. The 
prosecution of perpetrators of, for example, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes is naturally 
of fundamental importance to victims of such atrocities who are owed a form of retributive justice for 
their suffering, just as perpetrators are deserving of punishment for their acts. Such goals strike at the 
very heart of law. 
On a political level, it is in the interests of the international community and the transitioning state to ensure 
gross violations of human rights are punished in order to discredit and contain dictatorial or destabilizing 
political forces and make a positive contribution to post-conflict peace-building.1 As McEvoy argues, “law 
becomes an important practical and symbolic break with the past, an effort to publicly demonstrate a 
new-found legitimacy and accountability.”2 In this vein, “until Nuremberg, for the victims of German 
aggression all Germans and Germany as a whole were guilty; after Nuremberg, concrete Germans and the 
Hitler regime were guilty.”3 The reassertion of state authority is often achieved through the application of 
the rule of law for fear that “the absence of functioning centralized state institutions becomes a byword 
for lawlessness.”4 Law, therefore, dominates in an environment of reconstruction because it represents 
“a way of conceptualizing and articulating how we would like the social world to be.”5 
However, its effectiveness must be measured by what does not happen in the future; from a naturalist 
perspective, law is only successful if it “help[s]…prevent future atrocities through the power of moral 
example to transform behavior.”6 Just as we should use prosecutions as a way to prevent future atrocities, 
and therefore should judge their effectiveness within this context, we should also consider the success 
or failure of any transitional justice process in light of whether a society has been able to successfully 
transition.
Two Sets of Goals
Inevitably, this legalist approach manifests itself in a top-down manner, directed by the state or 
international institutions, resulting in transitional justice being “rooted firmly in the formal mechanisms 
and institutions of international criminal justice rather than in the communities most affected by conflict.”7 
Consequently, the purpose of the process becomes blurred; it centers on international and state level 
issues—from the need to reestablish international peace and security, to the creation of functioning state 
institutions. 
The fundamental problem with such a methodology is that it gives little regard to transitional justice’s long-
term goals of reconciliation of society and the “healing of wounds” of individual victims. Such methodology 
fails to recognize transitional justice as a process involving victims as individuals and as societies. No court, 
for example, can tell the full story of the Rwandan genocide or explain the remaining social divisions 
between Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs in Bosnia.
While both sets of goals—justice and reconciliation—are not exclusive of one another, a focus on justice 
exists because of the glorification of law.8 This glorification contributes to the exclusion of “local 
1- Payam Akhavan, Beyond impunity: Can international criminal justice prevent future atrocities? 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 7, 7 (2001).
2- Kieran McEvoy, Beyond legalism: Towards a thicker understanding of transitional justice, 34.4 J. L. & Soc. 411, 417 (2007).
3- Pierre Hazan, The Revolution by the ICTY: The concept of justice in wartime, 2.2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 533, 540 (2004).
4- McEvoy, supra note 4, at 422.
5- Id. at 416.
6- Akhavan, supra note 3, at 10.
7- McEvoy, supra note 4, at 414.
8- Id. at 426.
5communities as active participants,” in turn “raising fundamental questions of legitimacy, local ownership 
and participation,”1 posing a threat to genuine reconciliation.
This writer does not contend that legalism is useless, unnecessary, or a hindrance to the transitional 
processes, but that its fundamental flaw is its hegemony to the detriment of other mechanisms. Clearly, 
legalism acts and indeed should act, as the foundation or framework to the entire transitional process. 
Nevertheless, a complicated balancing act is necessary; judicial mechanisms are ineffective without 
complementary non-judicial mechanisms and vice versa.
Legalism’s dominance can be grouped under an umbrella of “universality”—under the logic that deficiencies 
arise from transitional justice’s basis in “Western conceptions of justice.”2 This encapsulates transitional 
justice’s political, internationalized and institutional nature that many legal practitioners and politicians 
refuse to acknowledge.
Legal Dominance—Political Character
When writing about the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, Katz suggested that “[t]he…procedures are diplomatic, 
and the relevant intellectual canons are the canons of political thought—with something added….a sense 
of law.”3 The essence of his point also captures the nature of transitional justice. At its core, it is usually 
a political compromise, meeting at an intersection of law, diplomacy and political theory. 
It is on this (political) balance upon which the question of whether legalism is always the best approach 
to transitional justice rests. The relevant approach determines “ownership” of the justice process just as 
the goals of any transition determine the mechanisms adopted. 
However, there exist practical deficits based on a failure to ask what the goal is and whom it is for, which 
leads to the problems of legal dominance, because if the process is “divorced from serious consideration 
of the wider political, social or cultural contexts which produced violence in the first place, the potential…
to prevent future violence is correspondingly reduced.”4 Instead, the process is simplified to the level of 
a “ritualistic attempt to restore equilibrium to a moral universe overwhelmed by evil.”5
Internationalized and Institutionalized
Alongside its political character, transitional justice is another example of the internationalization of 
law “wherein law’s centrality to globalization in general and international politics in particular has far 
outstripped its historic limitations associated with the notion of state sovereignty.”6 Its internationalized 
and centralized nature leads to law playing a vital role in the promotion of principles “such as justice, 
objectivity, certainty, uniformity, universality [and] rationality.”7 While this is indeed valuable to the 
emergence of a functioning state, its real-life application is left wanting due to the nature of the legal 
mechanisms adopted.
The use of a Westernized paradigm manifests itself in the form of international tribunals and so-called 
universal principles. However, this fails to embrace local suffering, which leads to “a poor understanding 
of peace transformation.”8 
1- Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, Whose justice? Rethinking transitional justice from the bottom up, 35.2 J. L. & Soc. 265, 
266 (2008).
2- Id. at 277.
3- D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law 8 (2004).
4- McEvoy, supra note 4, at 419.
5- Akhavan, supra note 3, at 7.
6- McEvoy, supra note 4, at 416.
7- Id. at 417.
8- Lundy & McGovern, supra note 11, at 278.
6Ultimately, legalism provides ownership to international institutions and the transitioning state, with a 
superficial consideration for the victims of large-scale abuses. In this respect, legalism, in the form of 
international institutions,1 proves to be the best approach for the field of international criminal law, as an 
exercise in itself. Such institutions become largely ‘institutions of, in and seemingly for the international 
community,”2 which represents little practical use for victims in tackling the past.3
In contrast, as Akhavan argues, “[j]ustice delivered close to the affected societies may encourage post 
conflict reconciliation and emerging democratic forces far more effectively than justice delivered in the 
remote confines of The Hague.”4
Judicial mechanisms can only be improved by holding trials where the atrocities occurred, which not only 
benefits victims but helps the “state reestablish [sic] itself with its new and presumably more democratic 
government.”5 Furthermore, as Hafner and King suggest, national and international trials can and should 
complement each other,6 as the ICTY and the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina have increasingly done so. 
The Effectiveness of Legal Methods?
Question marks remain, especially from a naturalist perspective, with regards to the effectiveness of 
individual criminal responsibility, which may “have no net effect on the number of war crimes—or even 
an effect opposite of the one intended.”7 At best, the “general deterrent effect of such prosecutions 
seems likely to be modest and incremental, rather than dramatic and transformative.”8 Individual criminal 
responsibility has not stopped nor, arguably, reduced the commission of international crimes globally, as has 
been plainly evident in countless war zones since 1995, from Chechnya to Syria. War crimes prosecutions 
have not prevented the possible genocides that took place in Darfur, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Syria and 
Iraq. The best-case scenario is that prosecutions regarding, for example, the former Yugoslavia will have 
a meaningful, long-lasting impact on the former Yugoslav republics by enforcing the rule of law and 
demonstrating a degree of justice to victims so that the 1991–1999 wars may never be repeated. At 
best, legalism may only work in helping a country avoid relapsing into bloodshed rather than setting a 
precedent for parties engaged in armed conflict elsewhere, as is all too obvious. International criminal 
law practitioners will, therefore, continue to find employment opportunities in this “growing market.”
Nevertheless, there are clear political considerations that blunt the effectiveness of the judicial approach. 
For example, the failure to indict Tuđman, Šušak and Boban for crimes committed in Croatia clearly 
“moderated the ICTY’s impact on post-conflict peace building and long-term prevention of elite-induced 
ethnic conflict.”9 If Radovan Karadžić is to be believed—and on this matter, he is, in Bosnia and the rest 
of former Yugoslavia—he was offered immunity from international criminal law prosecution by Richard 
1- In the form of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC.
2- Lundy & McGovern, supra note 11, at 278.
3- Sebina Sivac-Bryant, The Omarska Memorial Project as an example of how transitional justice interventions can produce 
hidden harms, 9 Int’l J. Transitional Just. 170, 171 (2015).
4- Akhavan, supra note 3, at 18.
5- Donald L. Hafner & Elizabeth B. L. King, Beyond traditional notions of transitional justice: How trials, truth commissions, 
and other tools for accountability can and should work together, 30 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 91, 96 (2007), http://
lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol30/iss1/6 (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
6- Id. at 97–98.
7- Michael Davis, What punishment for the murder of 10,000? 16.2 Res Publica 101, 104 (2010).
8- David Wippman, Atrocities, deterrence, and the limits of international justice, 23.2 Fordham Int’l L. J. 473, 488 (1999).
9- Akhavan, supra note 3, at 19.
7Holbrooke in exchange for leaving politics and public life.1 Such double standards naturally limit the 
effectiveness of prosecutions and any deterrent effect. 
While it is clear that impunity is an impediment to peace and stability,2 “the international community 
has accepted international crimes committed as an instrument of statecraft and political control.”3 This 
strikes at the heart of the problems associated with transitional justice—its failure to admit its political 
character and broaden the scope of legalism to distribute ownership of the process beyond the “the distant 
war crimes process.”4
Alternative Mechanisms
It is because of the law’s dominance that issues of legitimacy and (victim) ownership are raised, threatening 
what arguably should be transitional justice’s key long-term aim: reconciliation, whether it be in a post-
conflict or a newly democratic state. While no single mechanism can guarantee the achievement of such 
a goal, non-judicial approaches are able to overcome a number of the difficulties considered above.
Lundy and McGovern pointed out that if the aim of the transition is long-term peace and reconciliation, 
then “placing issues of ownership and participation at the center of long-term post-conflict justice”5 is 
crucial. Legalism, at the very least, when adopted on its own is insufficient because “[t]o imagine that 
the horrors of genocide can be contained within the confines of judicial process is to trivialize suffering 
that defies description.”6
Restorative Justice
Although there are rarely immediate results,7 practices in Rwanda, Guatemala, South Africa and Northern 
Ireland demonstrate that supported program in local community structures are able to engage in and make 
a significant contribution to long-term healing and reconciliation.8 This contrasts with Bosnia’s experience, 
where although reparations, exhumations, houses of memory and memorials were initiated, there were 
no truth commissions or community-based dialogues. Programs seeking to establish such processes were 
quickly abandoned. As a result, there still exist two sets of narratives between victim and perpetrator, 
with continued mistrust at all levels of society.
Gacaca in Rwanda
The move toward restorative justice, away from the purely retributive justice of the ICTR and Rwandan 
authorities via the adoption of “a new type of tribunal known as Gacaca, based on indigenous models 
of local justice,”9 is a welcome development. The “one-time opportunity to give testimony… [at an 
international tribunal or national court] cannot substitute for the long-term rehabilitation of survivors. 
1- Bruno Waterfield, US envoy Richard Holbrooke ‘did’ offer Radovan Karadzic immunity, The Telegraph (Mar. 23, 
2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/5039381/US-envoy-Richard-Holbrooke-did-offer-
Radovan-Karadzic-immunity.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
2- Akhavan, supra note 3, at 28.
3- Id. at 13.
4- Sivac-Bryant, supra note 21, at 171.
5- Lundy & McGovern, supra note 11, at 279.
6- Akhavan, supra note 3, at 10.
7- Laura Arriaza & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Social reconstruction as a local process, 2.2 Int’l J. Transitional Just. 152, 164 (2008).
8- McEvoy, supra note 4, at 428.
9- William A. Schabas, Genocide trials and Gacaca courts, 3.4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 879, 881 (2005).
8Longer term, local-level processes are needed for that type of healing.”1 Victims become more than tools 
of prosecutors in Arusha, achieving a degree of local ownership, as the historical record is established 
when perpetrators confess and name accomplices.2
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have the potential to “grant…victims the dignity of formal 
acknowledgment of their suffering, even if they personally do not appear as witnesses,”3 in addition to 
developing a broader picture of atrocities, which aids the truth-seeking aspect of transitional justice and 
better clarifies the historical record. This process may do more for dignity, healing, and reconciliation than 
the prosecution of political leaders, by ensuring that perpetrators are unable to “equalize responsibility 
and de-ethicize the victims.”4 
It must, however, be noted that Gacaca and the TRC’s impact depends upon the existence of parallel legal 
prosecutions, otherwise the offer of “amnesty for truth” would do little. And while they may fall into a 
framework of quasi-justice, supporters of retributive justice would point to a human rights deficit for the 
accused. However, the same is true for the 80,000-plus suspects that were detained for up to ten years 
under appalling conditions while they awaited trial in Rwanda.5
In Rwanda, extraordinary measures are clearly necessary and the fear that Gacaca may be “perceive[d]…as 
an exercise in victor’s justice” or as a way of imposing “collective guilt on the Hutu majority”6 is misplaced. 
The same accusation can be leveled at the ICTR, but in the eyes of many it would not dent its role as the 
“best means of determining responsibility.”7
Furthermore, the prosecution of a few leaders or instigators is insufficient.8 The writer cannot ascribe to 
Akhavan’s view that “[p]revention and punishment should focus primarily on those unscrupulous leaders 
who goad and exploit the forces advocating a spiral of violence”9 as has been the policy with regards 
to the former Yugoslavia. International crimes, particularly genocide, “are forms of group behavior” 
and “manifestations of group crime…[and] political violence,”10 so the resulting prosecutions must be 
all-encompassing. Indeed, the Rwandan government “has adopted an expansive prosecutorial strategy, 
incarcerating everyone it suspects of crimes of genocide throughout all strata of Rwandese society.”11
Once the “attrition rate”12 and the sheer volume of potential defendants is taken into account, it is 
clear that Gacaca presents a real opportunity to simultaneously engage with local communities and 
deliver justice, particularly as a way of balancing the human rights deficiencies evident in the Rwandan 
prosecutorial approach.
A significant development, however, exists in regard to truth-seeking objectives—namely, the increasingly 
1- Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 34, at 158.
2- Schabas, supra note 36, at 881.
3- Hafner & King, supra note 23, at 101.
4- Sonja Biserko, A look into the past means a step towards the future, Bosnian Institute (Oct.–Dec. 2004), http://www.
bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report_format.cfm?articleid=1154&reportid=166 (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
5- Schabas, supra note 36, at 888.
6- Max Rettig, Gacaca: Truth, justice, and reconciliation in post-conflict Rwanda? 51.3 Afr. Stud. Rev. 25, 26 (2008).
7- Hafner & King, supra note 23, at 92.
8- Application of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro), Oral Pleadings, ICJ Rep., 53 (March 7, 2006).
9- Akhavan, supra note 3, at 10.
10- Alette Smeulers, Punishing the enemies of all mankind, 21.4 Leiden J. Int’l L. 971, 977 (2008).
11- Aneta Wierzynska, Consolidating democracy through transitional justice: Rwanda’s Gacaca courts, 79.5 NYU L. Rev. 1934, 
1936 (2004).
12- McEvoy, supra note 4, at 436.
9inquisitorial or hybrid approaches in international criminal courts. This, to an extent, blunts the utility 
of TRCs and Gacaca style approaches because “criminal prosecution of war crimes can help to strengthen 
the rule of law and establish the truth about the past through accepted legal means,”1 which in turn 
contributes to the legitimacy of the new social order and the healing of individual victims. Of course, such 
an objective will always remain secondary to the primary process of determining the guilt of individual 
defendants, while remaining far from the comprehensive account of atrocities that is necessary. Present-
day inquisitorial prosecutions may not have the same effect that Nuremberg and subsequent transitional 
justice initiatives had on the German and European psyches. 
Nationalist Myths and Nation-Building
A broader, holistic approach may have spared Bosnian victims the scenario in which Serb nationalist forces 
were able to create an atmosphere of denial in the former Yugoslavia to the extent that a Republika Srpska 
official report described the Srebrenica genocide as a mass suicide on the part of Bosnian Muslims. Even 
twenty years after the Srebrenica genocide, local Serbs, as well as Russian, Serbian, and Bosnian Serb 
politicians, continue to question the established narrative, which not only harms reconciliation but is likely 
to be a cause of future violence.
Attempts at creating a memorial at the Omarska concentration camp outside Prijedor in Bosnia failed 
miserably because there still exists a veil of silence, a refusal to acknowledge past abuses. Victims must 
suffer the all too prevalent remark that “nothing happened at Omarska,” despite the fact that “the crimes 
committed in Prijedor are known to every citizen of the town even if it is not openly spoken about.”2 
Exacerbating tensions, the British mediator in Prijedor managed to assemble a committee comprised of 
fourteen Serbs, six Muslims and four Croats,3 disregarding the notion of a victim-led process. However, the 
issue of ownership also extends to inter-Muslim tensions between returnees and diaspora, with accusations 
of extremism leveled at those (diaspora) more belligerent in their interactions with local Serbs.4 While local 
returnees have little choice but to engage in cordial relations with their Serb neighbors, the summertime 
returning diaspora view this cordiality as borderline treasonous. However, even local Muslims do not view 
their largely civil interactions with Serbs as a sign of progress. It is merely convenience. 
In the writer’s hometown of Srebrenica, such sentiment is more pronounced. Every summer, tensions 
grow, people begin to mutter under their breath, looking at each passer-by to determine whether they 
are Muslim or Serb, or rather “balija” or “četnik.” Such outcomes are perhaps understandable when one 
side is the victim of genocide and the other refuses to fully admit its past, viewing each prosecution as a 
form of victimization and an attack on the collective. When Muslims annually congregate at the Potočari 
Memorial Centre on July 11 to bury the latest round of exhumed corpses, Serbs remember their dead 
from the summer and autumn of 1992, ignoring the initial murders of the Muslims, who had remained in 
Srebrenica, in April 1992 by the paramilitary group Arkan’s Tigers and the three-year siege that followed 
the Bosnian Army liberation. At the July 2016 ceremony, Bosnian Muslim survivors refused to permit any 
Serbian and Republika Srpska government officials to attend on account of continued denials over the 
Srebrenica genocide.5
TRC and Gacaca-style approaches offer something simple but absolutely necessary—the opportunity for 
individuals and communities to talk. The lack of a TRC or similar mechanism allows a nation or people to 
1- Hafner & King, supra note 23, at 93.
2- Sivac-Bryant, supra note 21, at 174.
3- Id. at 177.
4- Id. at 176.
5- Maja Zuvela, Srebrenica buries 127 victims of massacre, Serbs absent over genocide denial, Reuters (July 11, 2016), 
https://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKCN0ZR1IC (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
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forget its crimes. Naturally, the outside world will know the truth, possibly imposing a collective guilt on 
the ethnic or national group of the perpetrators. In turn, this fosters a victimhood or siege mentality. Many 
nations share this experience; their unwillingness to speak openly about past crimes, whether European 
genocide in the Americas, the United States genocide of Native Americans leaves them open to further 
scrutiny and guilt by association or denial. Contrast this to Germany’s ownership of its history. Within the 
Serbian context, silence and lies become a prerequisite for the propagation and advancement of “Greater 
Serbia” myths and nation-building,1 ad they not only shield the nation from hard truths but protect its elite. 
Such denials lead to the perpetration and ghettoization of future generations.2 Once these generations 
forget their nation’s history, they face the prospect of repeating the sins of their forefathers. This is the 
point at which transitional justice officially fails.
Non-Judicial Eastern Europe
Somewhat anomalously, in former Communist dictatorships, as a result of political necessity, there have 
been no significant attempts at judicially inspired transitions. Instead, the process has largely revolved 
around mechanisms such as lustration, memorials, and the release of state documents.
This non-judicial approach is based on a “sharp line of demarcation, between what has been done in 
the past and the need to move forward.”3 Such a view is perhaps only reached by a belief in the moral 
ambiguity of decision making in dictatorial states and thus creates unease with prosecuting, for example, 
informants.4
However, significant criticisms have been leveled at such policies on the basis that they failed to achieve 
much beyond moving along the business of government. Post-communist governments were more 
preoccupied with market liberalization and the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies with the potential 
to inflict a new form of (economic) injustice on ordinary citizens. It is difficult to conclude that justice 
was served or reconciliation was achieved. However, the issue of reconciliation in post-dictatorial states 
is not as profound as it is to post-armed conflict states, so the threshold can be lowered.
Recommendations
Going forward, transitional justice processes in Sri Lanka, Syria and elsewhere, ideally instigated by 
the United Nations, will require the formulation of broad holistic strategies, from utilizing local level 
prosecutions to the implementation of non-judicial mechanisms such as TRCs. Transitional justice has 
the potential to be the ignition for a new society—one forced to confront past abuses and to engage in 
dialogue. These processes, with the exception of their formation, will require locally led implementation. 
Within legalist mechanisms, there needs to be a recalibration to neutralize the overt international and 
institutionalized characteristics of prosecutions, away from the ICC and ICTY model to one centered on 
hybrid courts, as in Cambodia. Such courts, embedded within the domestic jurisdiction of the affected 
society, would represent the best of two approaches, in turn overcoming the difficulties domestic 
prosecutions face in their limited capacity and experience, while also guaranteeing a local process and 
ownership. Not having to solely resort to the ICC’s complementarity would aid the development of the 
state and its institutions going forward, demonstrating a degree of competence and legitimacy in the new 
political and legal order. The courts’ simplified procedure and reduced cost will strengthen retributive 
justice aims in being able to prosecute a greater number of perpetrators. The local-level process would 
1- Ensar Eminović, Ruski veto je geto, Al Jazeera Balkans (July 13, 2015), http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/ruski-veto-je-
geto (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
2- Id.
3- A. James McAdams, Transitional justice: The issue that won’t go away, 5.2 Int’l J. Transitional Just. 304, 305 (2011).
4- Id. at 309.
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allow the embrace of local suffering, giving voice to the victims and increasing the chances of reconciliation 
through local dialogue.
Ultimately, acknowledgment of past crimes and abuses is a prerequisite for reconciliation, the first of many 
steps. The appropriation of the narratives of victims and survivors must not be permitted, both by the legal 
process and the perpetrators. A quasi-Gacaca or, more likely, a TRC process is also necessary—the public 
shaming and confessions of known perpetrators, as well as the forced revelation of still unidentified mass 
graves, offer an opportunity for rehabilitation and healing. Such truth-seeking objectives are evident in 
the work of the ICTY, but the distant process appears to have had little positive impact on both Muslim 
and Serb psyches in Bosnia. Both groups shrug at the news of another drawn-out prosecution, unable to 
let go of the past, unable to accept the historical record, forever stuck in 1995. A TRC, with the necessary 
international backing and financing, would, at the very least, force both sides to talk to one another 
outside the traditional confines of politics and prosecutions. The original sin in Bosnia’s transition was the 
Dayton Agreement, which legally enforced gains from ethnic cleansing and genocide, legitimized nationalist 
politics and myths and cemented divisions across the country. The focus on ICTY prosecutions did little to 
address these structural problems.
Future TRCs need to learn from past mistakes, the most notable of which is stifling time constraints. The 
investigation of all alleged crimes without time constraints, as seen during the Chile Commission, along 
with the necessary funding and political will is paramount. One only has to contrast Chile’s political, 
economic, and societal development with that of El Salvador to notice that providing ownership, truth-
seeking and an opportunity for dialogue is crucial. One is peaceful and developing; the other faces a 
refugee crisis and exodus because of high rates of homicides, corruption and gang warfare. Of course, this 
is anecdotal, but the different TRC routes taken by each has undoubtedly contributed to their respective 
divergent state of affairs.
Moreover, adequate top-down funding for bottom-up projects, such as museums and memorials, plays a 
significant part in the healing process. However, the key to all of this is political will—if the international 
community and future national governments refuse or fail to follow through, the transition will be 
incomplete. The top-down approach dominates transitional justice because without the resources and 
support from either international or national actors, bottom-up endeavors cannot begin to deliver on the 
healing required. This has been the case with Bosnia; Hague-level prosecutions are relatively easy and 
justifiable, while local-level initiatives prove difficult to pursue, let alone to successfully implement.
Conclusion
In many ways, the question of whether legalism is always the best approach to transitional justice is 
moot because of its guaranteed “place as the core framework around which transitions from conflict are 
constructed.”1 Indeed, other policies such as Gacaca, TRCs, lustration, and amnesties are themselves 
“creatures of law.”2 Conversely, these alternative methods are themselves far from perfect. For every 
moderately successful TRC, another fails outright or is significantly stifled due to politic considerations and 
limited scope and time frame. Each will have significant trade-offs3 due to the inexorable link between 
transitional justice and politics.
Legal remedies are prerequisites for gross violations of law in armed conflict situations. For the sake of 
1- McEvoy, supra note 4, at 413.
2- Id. at 426.
3- While Chile’s commission focused on truth-seeking and the investigation of all 3,000 individual crimes, it did so at the 
expense of individual criminal responsibility. El Salvador’s commission sought to apportion individual responsibility, but, 
because of a nine-month window, was only able to investigate thirty-two cases, even with 22,000 registered complaints by 
victims. See Mark Vasallo, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: General considerations and a critical comparison of the 
commissions of Chile and El Salvador, 33 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 153 (2002).
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justice and the future of the state, legalism always becomes the best approach by default. Whatever 
answers one takes from Eastern European experiences, it must be acknowledged that post-armed conflict 
states do not have the luxury of a purely non-judicial approach.
As this paper has argued, legalism without alternative mechanisms, preferably bottom-up orientated, 
does not sufficiently look beyond the immediate needs of the state and international criminal justice. 
Each society will therefore need a broad ad hoc strategy encompassing multiple layers of the transition. 
Allowing one atomized mechanism to dominate, at the expense of developing a holistic solution to the 
needs of each society, will not help post-conflict Syria, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and countless others.
This inability to seriously consider and give effect to the various aims of transitional justice has created 
an overreliance on law—a problem considering the effect its political, internationalized and institutional 
character has on ownership, truth and reconciliation. This represents a massive risk, as highlighted by the 
fact that “40 per cent of post-conflict societies return to conflict within a span of five years.”1 In Bosnia’s 
case—and especially because of the increased political risks in the western Balkans, such as the increased 
threat of terrorism, the refugee and migration crisis, the American pivot away from Eastern Europe, the 
European Union’s various distractions, Russia’s expanding presence and influence in the region, not to 
mention the resurgence of Milošević style nationalists in Belgrade—there is a legitimate and ever-growing 
risk of conflict. This will mean that, if it is not already the case, transitional justice has failed in the 
former Yugoslavia. The ICTY’s 161 indictments mean very little outside the institutions of international 
criminal law. 
The state of denial prevalent within the Bosnian Serb community in relation to the commission of genocide 
against Bosnian Muslims is both evidence for the necessity of legalism and the need to move beyond it. 
The international community’s focus on legalism through the ICTY and the domestic prosecutions of a few 
leaders and commanders has not managed to effectively change this mentality. Considering the collective 
nature of such violence, whether through direct engagement or silent acquiescence, legal practitioners 
and politicians must broaden the scope to combat such recalcitrance.
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